


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PAKISTANI PRESIDENT AYUB'S PROBLEMS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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PAKISTANI PRESIDENT AYUB'S PROBLEMS

In eight years as Pakistan's ruler, Mohammed Ayub Khan has maintained a stable government and has dealt effectively with economic problems. He has failed, however, to make any significant progress toward improving Pakistan's vital relations with India.

Ayub's inability to gain an acceptable agreement on Kashmir--the outstanding Indo-Pakistani problem--has weakened his support in the army and added a new weapon to his opposition's arsenal. In addition, the side effects of his ill-calculated attempt to use force to find a solution last September have revived separatist agitation in East Pakistan.

Domestic criticism--primarily directed at his foreign policy--has become a major problem for Ayub. The critics can be silenced only by success in dealing with India, which appears unlikely. In the absence of such success, Ayub will be forced to conduct both his domestic and foreign policies with greater regard to the opinions of his opponents.

Ayub and the Army


Ayub appears to be most concerned with criticism from the military. If supported by the rest of Pakistani society, the President could probably remain in power for some time without the active backing of the army, but he would fall quickly were the army to move against him. Ayub, a professional soldier, has had generally good relations with the army since he came to power. His outlook has usually coincided with that of other Pakistani military leaders. He has shared the army's high estimate of its importance for the country, and he

has retained considerable personal influence in the officer corps.

These good relations with the army were damaged by the failure of Ayub's attempt to force a Kashmir solution in 1965. His military critics cite a variety of reasons for the failure, among them Ayub's miscalculation of the Indian reaction when he sent "freedom fighters" into Kashmir in August, the incompetence of generals appointed for their loyalty to Ayub, his agreement to the September cease-fire which allegedly cheated the army of victory, and, finally, his

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failure to exploit what his critics considered to be Pakistan's favorable military situation during the Tashkent discussions in January.

Some officers are worried by the specter of another war with India and by Pakistan's lack of military supplies to replace combat losses and to equip new units they believe necessary to offset recent Indian strength increases. Prior to the September war, the US was Pakistan's major arms supplier, but during that conflict Washington halted military aid and sales to both India and Pakistan. As Pakistan relied far more heavily than India on US arms assistance, the action had a much greater effect in Rawalpindi than in New Delhi.

Ayub has sought more arms in several places. Iran and Turkey have supplied some equipment,

The money available and the supplies received have not been sufficient to meet Pakistan's needs, however, and Ayub has turned to Communist China.

The Chinese have so far sent a few squadrons of MIG-19 Farmer jet fighters, a few IL-28 Beagle jet light bombers (possibly as many as 50 aircraft in all), probably more than 100 medium tanks,

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The incoming arms, the military expansion, and the resultant promotions have partially restored the military's confidence in Ayub's ability. The arms problem is far from solved, however, and Ayub has been able to do little to still criticism of his failure to win Kashmir. Despite his diplomatic efforts, New Delhi has given no indication that it will enter meaningful talks on Kashmir. Without a Kashmir solution Ayub appears to face a choice between shifting the blame from himself--India would be the most likely choice as a scapegoat, but the US could easily be brought into the picture--or of eventually trying a new military effort to force a solution.

Despite discontent within the military, and occasional coup rumors, Ayub's standing with the armed forces remains fairly high. The senior officers appear to be loyal--many attained their present positions partly because of that loyalty. Dissatisfied junior officers have been unable to find a leader of Ayub's stature, and even many of his critics probably do not believe that a change at the top would be an improvement. Ayub has to be careful to avoid a further diminution of his prestige in the army, but his image has not yet been hurt enough to threaten his retention of power.

Ayub and his Government

Criticism of Ayub in the upper levels of the civilian government has been less than in the military. Those actually involved in the formulation of foreign policy find it more difficult to

shift the blame for Kashmir onto the President. Nevertheless, Ayub has found it necessary to ask for the resignations of two of the most prominent members of his cabinet, and further cabinet changes cannot be ruled out.

Ayub encourages debate on policy within the cabinet and frequently accepts its advice. However, he expects his ministers to give unqualified support to the final decision, for which he takes full responsibility. To prevent one-sided advice, Ayub has tried to maintain a balance between various points of view in his cabinet.

Foreign Minister Bhutto, who was placed on "sick" leave in mid-June and later replaced after four years in the cabinet, apparently failed to measure up to Ayub's criteria for cabinet ministers in several ways. He was disloyal in failing to give wholehearted public support to Ayub's decisions.

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He may have disobeyed orders

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just prior to his dismissal. Bhutto probably was so insistent in urging Ayub

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that the President felt he could no longer trust his foreign minister's advice. Moreover, Ayub may have felt that Bhutto gave the appearance of becoming a rival.

Pro-Western Finance Minister Shoaib, whose resignation was announced in early July, had given no such evidence of disloyalty.

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Ayub probably felt, however, that with Shoaib now the dominant figure in the cabinet, advice would tend to become distorted in favor of the West. Shoaib's resignation also served to quiet public rumors that Bhutto's dismissal, which followed the resumption of US economic aid by only a few days, was the result of US pressure.

The differing views of Bhutto and Shoaib on East-West relations were related to the different priority they gave to the Kashmir question and Pakistan's economic development. Bhutto appeared to give precedence to moving closer to China as an ally against India. Shoaib, however, was reluctant to risk American economic aid--halted in the summer of 1965 because of the war and not resumed until June 1966--by doing so.

Ayub's control of the civilian government remains firm. Although Bhutto may eventually become an open rival of Ayub--he has cooperated with opposition leaders to some extent since his dismissal--the removal of the two cabinet members has not significantly hurt Ayub. Ayub's relations with West Pakistan's governor, the Khan of Kalabagh, have been worsening, primarily because of what Kalabagh regards as unnecessary interference by Ayub in the Khan's province. Backbenchers in Ayub's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) have echoed opposition and military criticism of the President. Ayub's supporters, however, have no candidate to replace him and are reluctant to risk their jobs by acting against him.

Economic Problems

Pakistan cannot continue its present economic development without extensive foreign aid. Since the mid-1950s slightly less than half of the total development funds for Pakistan's five-year plans have come from foreign sources. The Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70) will require an even greater amount, although the percentage of foreign financing in the total development funds will fall to about a third. The US has provided about half the loan and grant aid--a total US contribution through 1965 of about \$2.9 billion--with other Western nations providing most of the balance and Communist countries only a comparatively small amount. In fiscal 1967 US non-project aid may reach \$140 million.

Pakistanis are proud of the economic progress they have made so far, but a slowdown might turn their pride and hope into resentment against the government. This, reinforced by economic distress, would create a highly unstable situation which could easily get beyond Ayub's control.

Development programs are politically useful to Ayub for other than economic reasons. He has used them to reward followers, although he has had to tolerate some corruption and inefficiency as a result. More important, the programs have gained support for Ayub on the local level. The clearest example is among the Pathans of the North West Frontier, who through force of arms remained semi-independent

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even under British rule. Ayub has given the Pathans a much larger share of the development funds than either their almost negligible taxes or their effect on Pakistan's economy warrant. However, the new prosperity on the frontier did much to prevent Afghan blandishments from leading to rebellion in the early 1960s and has kept a generally unruly people relatively quiet since.

The Political Opposition

The open political opposition is probably the least of Ayub's worries. Ayub has shown little hesitancy in arresting leaders when they become too obstreperous, and the opposition activities in parliament and throughout the country are often confused and futile.

All opposition parties have tried to portray Ayub as a dictator and have exploited his failure to win Kashmir. The details of their criticism, however, indicate the differences they must overcome to pose a serious threat. At one end of the political spectrum the ultraconservative Jamaat-i-Islami Party denounces the "dictatorship" which has prevented the amendment of the constitution to conform with Islamic principles, Ayub's failure to govern according to the precepts of the Koran, and his abandonment of the "holy war" to save Kashmir from Hindu idolaters. At the other end, the far-left National Awami Party (NAP) takes Ayub to task for imprisoning leftist propagandists and for bowing to alleged imperialist pressures in

halting the war against the Indians who, they claim, had American backing.

Even within the opposition parties--most notably the moderate Awami League (AL)--there is dissension. The AL's East Pakistan and West Pakistan wings have come close to a complete break because of widely differing views on the separatist movement among the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Other parties have been divided to a lesser extent, but all have been hurt, either through a split over Bengali separatism, or through a loss of Bengali support when the parties' East Pakistan branches have chosen close ties with the antiautonomy West Pakistan leaders.

Periodic attempts to unify the opposition have brought temporary cooperation, but no lasting program. In the 1965 presidential election, the opposition parties were able to unite in backing a compromise candidate, Fatima Jinnah, the politically inexperienced sister of Pakistan's founder, but after her defeat the unity quickly dissolved. The right and center parties have since maintained a semblance of cooperation despite frequent squabbles. The far left NAP has disassociated itself from even theoretical unity. Ayub, who would probably do well at the polls anyway, has reinforced his position by careful manipulation of Pakistan's intricate election machinery. An indirect election system allows him to concentrate his efforts-

on the 80,000 electors--called

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Basic Democrats--who actually choose officials, rather than on the much larger number of voters who select the Basic Democrats.

The political opposition does not appear to be in a position to offer a serious challenge to Ayub. None of their leaders is as widely known or as popular as Ayub. The opposition will probably continue to talk, to walk out of parliament, and to run candidates against the PML, but its major threat will lie in sustaining its criticism of Ayub and eventually striking a responsive chord among a dissatisfied populace.

East Pakistan

Potentially the most serious threat to Ayub--and to the nation itself--is the resurgence of separatist sentiment in East Pakistan, which falls just short of demands for complete independence. The majority of the people of East Pakistan are Bengalis, who have little in common with West Pakistanis other than their Muslim religion and a fear of India. East Pakistan differs climatically, economically, and culturally from the western province. The Bengalis believe--with some reason--that the central government is being run for the benefit of West Pakistan, even though the eastern province earns more than its share of foreign exchange and has over half the country's population.

The September war awakened dormant separatist sentiment. Many Bengalis felt that Ayub had left them undefended--only one under-

strength division was in East Pakistan--while he made a futile effort to seize Kashmir, an area of little interest to Bengalis. The central government's assurance that East Pakistan could be defended by troops in the West had little impact on people a thousand miles from the defending forces. Later government assertions that India's fear of possible Chinese actions prevented an attack on East Pakistan have only confused the issue without reassuring the eastern province.

Separatist sentiment is strengthened by the large number of non-Bengalis--including native East Pakistanis--in high positions in the province, the predominance of West Pakistanis in the central government and the military, the fear that West Pakistan has plans to eliminate Bengali language and culture, and other real and imagined grievances.

The stated aim of the current agitation is to gain provincial autonomy, with most of the demands centering on economic reform. Several parties have issued programs, the most prominent being the six points of Mujibur-Rahman, leader of the East Pakistan Awami League. Mujib is demanding a federal government responsible for defense and foreign affairs only, some means of preventing the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan--perhaps a separate currency--no central taxation, separate administration of foreign trade, and the right of each province to raise its own defense force. The program is designed to eliminate the

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present alleged discrimination against East Pakistan in allotting central government and foreign development funds, to end the use of East Pakistan's exports to finance West Pakistan's imports, and to stop the use of East Pakistani taxes to develop and defend West Pakistan.

Factors not directly related to autonomy, such as the rising cost of food, also have played a part in increasing dissatisfaction in East Bengal. Uncertainty as to the reaction of the highly volatile population, which in June turned a general strike into a riot in Dacca, made the government cautious at first. Autonomy advocates were given more freedom of action than many opposition politicians have enjoyed in Pakistan. Subsequently, stronger repressive measures, which led to the death of some agitators, were instituted and have increased resentment against the government.

So far, active support of the autonomy movement has been largely confined to Dacca and a few other cities, but it could spread fairly easily.

Despite its strengths, however, the movement has serious weaknesses. Mujib-ur-Rahman has insisted on leading the movement and has refused to cooperate with

other opposition leaders except on his own terms. Some other East Pakistani parties have been able to form a tenuous alliance, but the movement remains essentially one in which the leaders are jealous of their positions and more interested in leading the movement than in gaining autonomy.

The difficulty of solving many of East Pakistan's problems would hinder even the most capable and dedicated government. The lower educational level among Bengalis makes it inevitable that they will receive less than their "rightful" share of high government positions. The terrain of East Pakistan makes any development project much more expensive than an equivalent project in West Pakistan. Foreign aid suppliers are less interested in such projects and, even with an equitable distribution of aid funds, the lack of results would probably leave the Bengalis feeling cheated. Ayub knows that equal defense forces for East Pakistan would make both provinces too weak to resist an Indian attack and has chosen to defend the western province. Should the government grant Mujib's six points, or the programs of his competitors, the central government would become powerless.

Ayub's actions have at least temporarily slowed the momentum of the movement. Ayub began his campaign with public speeches denouncing the movement and with harassing arrests of Mujib. Continued Bengali agitation drove

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Ayub to close an opposition newspaper and institute large-scale arrests, which have limited the efficiency of the AL by removing its first- and second-echelon leaders. Riots followed, and the use of armed police resulted in the deaths of several agitators. So far Ayub has not used the army, in which there is almost no separatist sentiment. He may well do so if he feels it necessary.

Outlook

The odds are against Ayub's finding a permanent solution to his domestic problems. Pakistan's resources are so sparse that it will require almost constant effort to prevent a decline in living standards. The diversity of the population makes separatism a continuing problem, not only among the Bengalis of East Pakistan, but potentially among the Baluchis and Pathans of West Pakistan. Centuries of Hindu-Moslem antagonism have cre-

ated a situation in which neither India nor Pakistan is willing to make any significant concessions in dealing with mutual problems, and the people of Pakistan are likely to regard any compromise as a failure of government diplomacy.

Ayub can hope for little more than limited economic progress, continued control of separatist movements, and enough diplomatic success against India to prevent criticism from getting out of hand. Many Pakistanis, including the military, feel that Ayub, even with the failure of his attempt to force a Kashmir solution, has probably done at least as well as anyone else could have. Another major policy failure, however, might well change Pakistani attitudes. Ayub will have to make this possibility a major consideration in forming his domestic and foreign policies.

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